Fayceoff Pitch Deck Teardown: A 2012 Vision

Introduction: The 2012 Social Gaming Secondary Market

The Fayceoff investor deck, dated February 14, 2012, captures a specific moment in the evolution of the 'social gaming' era. During this period, companies like Zynga were dominant, but monetization remained a significant hurdle. Fayceoff's pitch centers on the idea that virtual goods—items used in games like FarmVille—represent a massive untapped market if they can be traded between players. The deck positions Fayceoff as a 'social trading network' that facilitates this peer-to-peer exchange.

Slide 1: Title and Branding

The cover slide introduces the brand 'Fayceoff' with the tagline 'social trading network.' It prominently features a 'private beta' badge, signaling that the product is live but not yet fully public. The contact information for Mark Sendo is provided, along with the date of February 14, 2012. The visual style, featuring glossy reflections and a dark background, is characteristic of early 2010s tech aesthetics.

Slide 2: The Market Problem

Fayceoff identifies a stark disparity in the social gaming market. While '60,000 virtual goods are used every second,' only '1% - 3% [of users] Spend Money.' The slide uses a screenshot of FarmVille by Zynga to illustrate the current landscape. The core friction points identified are that 'Games own the virtual goods' and 'Gamers currently cannot transfer said goods.' This sets the stage for a solution that unlocks the liquidity of these digital assets.

Slide 3: Monetization and Revenue Share

This slide explains the mechanics of the platform. Gamers purchase 'Fayceoff Credit' to bid on or buy items. A screenshot of the interface shows various credit packages ranging from $5.00 (500 credits) to $50.00 (5,000 credits), with payment options including PayPal, mobile, bank, and phone. A critical business model detail is revealed here: 'Developers, of the game where Credit is purchased, will receive 95% of revenue.' This high payout is likely intended to overcome developer resistance to third-party trading. The slide claims that finding bargains on virtual items will 'increase the raw number of paying users.'

Slide 4: Market Share and Partnerships

Fayceoff outlines its go-to-market strategy through five channels. The most significant claims include a 'Sales Pipeline of over 250 game companies' and a partnership with 'iQU' which supposedly grants access to '100 million unique users.' Other mentioned partners include Atari, Digital River, and 'theg (OF).' The strategy also involves placing sales representatives in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Europe, and Asia to establish local awareness and sign third-party publishers.

Slide 5: Organization Chart

The team slide is presented as a formal hierarchy. Mark Sendo is the CEO, flanked by two 'XXX' placeholders for future Board Seats. The leadership team includes Shashi (Engineering), Jonathan (Mobile), Chris Mack (Platform Design), Mani (Lead Developer), and Leyya (CFO/COO). The chart also lists specialized technical roles such as an 'HTMLIZer' and a 'Flash Engineer Consultant,' reflecting the technology stack of the era. An 'Advisers' box is included but does not list specific names, only 'Industry & Business Experts.'

Slide 6: Trivia (Milestones and Exit Strategy)

The final slide, titled 'Trivia,' serves as a roadmap and summary of achievements. It confirms that 'Phase 1' is launched and $300k has been raised in note/equity. It also states that a '$500,000 Seed Round' has closed. The roadmap includes scaling to mobile and developing a 'Social Trading Game Engine.' Looking forward, the company targets a 'Series A - $2 to $4 million.' The slide concludes with a list of potential exit partners: GREE, Atari, VISA, Digital River, and Facebook.

What Fayceoff Does Well

The deck is highly specific about its monetization model. By stating the exact revenue share (95%) for developers on Slide 3, Fayceoff addresses the most obvious objection: why would a game developer let a third party handle their item sales? The inclusion of a functional UI screenshot for credit purchases also suggests that the 'private beta' is more than just a landing page; there is a working transaction layer.

Furthermore, the deck does a good job of quantifying its reach through partnerships. Mentioning a pipeline of 250 companies and a 100-million-user partnership provides a sense of scale that offsets the early stage of the product itself.

What is Missing from the Fayceoff Deck

The most glaring omission is the lack of specific names for the Board of Directors and the Advisers. Slide 5 uses 'XXX' placeholders for board seats and generic labels for advisors. For a seed-stage company, the quality of the board and advisors is often a key trust signal for investors.

Additionally, while the deck mentions a '95% revenue share' to developers, it does not explicitly state Fayceoff's own take rate or how they cover operational costs if they are passing nearly all revenue to the developer. It is unclear if Fayceoff takes the remaining 5% or if there are other fees involved. There is also no mention of the legal or terms-of-service hurdles involved in trading goods from games owned by companies like Zynga, who historically guarded their ecosystems closely.

Founder Takeaways: Secondary Market Pitches

For founders building in the secondary market or 'trading' space, Fayceoff offers a few lessons. First, the '95% revenue share' is a bold way to frame a partnership—it positions the startup as a service provider to the incumbent rather than a competitor. Second, the use of a 'Trivia' slide to combine history, current status, and future goals is an efficient way to close a deck, though 'Roadmap' or 'Milestones' might be a more professional heading.

Finally, the deck shows the importance of defining the 'Problem' in terms of lost revenue. By framing the issue as 'only 1-3% spend money,' Fayceoff makes their solution a tool for market expansion rather than just a utility for existing spenders. This is a powerful narrative for any B2B2C platform.